The concept of a right to health, to some extent guaranteed to citizens by government, has within it heavy political as well as social overtones. The demand to "keep politics out of health" is a futile one, and it is now heard with less and less frequency.
I
Ti FIRST FEDERAL HEALTH LAWS Early federal action in the health field was almost entirely pragmatic, and much of it was brought about by the menace of recurrent epidemics of yellow fever. It was George Washington who asked Congress to pass the first federal health law, a purely utilitarian proposal to allow the Chief Executive to convene Congress outside the capital if epidemic disease should threaten the members. Washington's move occurred when the great yellow fever epidemic of 1793 forced the entire government to flee from Philadelphia. Washington himself left in September and found it next to impossible to run the government by correspondence from Mount Vernon. His request was so obviously sensible that it stirred virtually no opposition, and Congress quickly obliged. 2 It was quite otherwise when Congress brought a federal quarantine proposal under debate in 1796. The debate on this matter in the House dealt with the powers of the central government to impose the quarantine. Representative Lyman, arguing matter under consideration. 7 It concluded that vaccination had best be in the hands of the states and repealed the law in 1823 during Monroe's "era of good feeling." ' The entire episode was a curious one politically. It was, in fact, an admission by the Jeffersonians that certain health measures might be assigned, pro bono publico, to the central government, but neither the residue of the federalist movement nor its successors ever seem to have made political capital of it.
II JOHN MARSHALL SETTLES THE MATER
But the quarantine precedent of 1796 was soon to receive resounding support from the Supreme Court. It came in the form of a famous (and prodigiously long) decision written in 1824 by John Marshall. An extraordinarily astute jurist and a last-minute federalist appointment to the Court, Marshall (and his Court) had under consideration the question of interstate commerce. It had been precipitated when the State of New York granted an exclusive franchise for steam navigation within the state to Robert Fulton and Robert Livingston. The matter of quarantine had been introduced into the argument to support New York's action in awarding the franchise; but Marshall was unimpressed. "Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description," he wrote, are all part of an "immense mass of legislation" which the Constitution does not assign to the central government and which, therefore, remain in the hands of the states.' But, the Court's ruling ran, the power to enact such laws does not derive from the power to regulate commerce, a power specifically assigned by the Constitution to the central government. And if state quarantine laws should interfere with "the laws of the United States, made for the regulation of commerce .... 
. "10
Marshall's interpretation of the Constitution was a strict and far-reaching one: regulation of interstate and foreign commerce was specifically assigned to the Congress by article I, section 8, subsection 3; health matters were not specifically assigned and therefore belonged to the states under the tenth amendment.
This, in any case, was the effect of the decision. But Marshall had left a loophole. Referring to "that immense mass of legislation . .. not surrendered to the general [federal] government," he added that "[i]f the legislative power of the Union can reach them, it must for national purposes."' 1 His meaning is, perhaps intentionally, obscure, but he may have been doing nothing more than taking into account the possibility that the nation might one day be faced with a massive threat to health, possibly a pandemic, which would make use of federal resources mandatory. There matters rested, insofar as federal legislation affecting the health of the general public was concerned, for many decades. From the time of the Jackson administration (1829-37) to the outbreak of the Civil War, the nation was almost totally preoccupied with expanding its boundaries and its communications. Considerations of the social obligations of government found no place in Congressional debate of the period, although toward the latter part of it there was some activity of the sort at the state level, notably in Massachusetts.' 2
The post-Civil-War period was one of industrial expansion and conservative political action. The American Medical Association, founded in 1847, had taken no formal political stand, but its actions before and after the Civil War show unmistakably that it approved of government intervention, federal and state, in the field of public health. It went on record as favoring federal quarantine authority and a federal health department.' 3 But, said its leadership, medical care for the individual is the medical profession's inviolate territory and obligation.' 4 Even so, the Association was, and for many years remained, well in advance of the federal government with regard to the health interests of the nation.
In 1878, crisis finally goaded the Congress to action. It came in the form of another yellow fever epidemic beginning in early summer in New Orleans and moving rapidly up the Mississippi River valley. Before the epidemic had run its course, twenty to thirty thousand had died and the country was in an uproar. Congress reacted, while the epidemic was in progress, by passing new quarantine actions that still carefully avoided encroachment on states' rights. But in 1879, following a Senate select committee report, a bill to create a National Board of Health, with supervisory quarantine authority, was introduced and became law on March 3.5 A second bill, designed to clarify and strengthen the Board's authority, was introduced soon after. 6 It was the old federalist-antifederalist political argument all over again except that sectional alignments were by now somewhat altered. Yet this time the advocates of strong federal quarantine authority carried the field. The bill passed and the National Board set to work, but under great difficulties. Within a year it was under heavy fire from state authorities (notably those from Louisiana), who resented its intrusion into their affairs, and there was bitter opposition, led by the Marine Hospital Service, from within the federal government itself. The end result was that the law setting up the Board, which had been given four years to run, was allowed by Congress to expire. States' rights were still a treacherous political issue, and, in addition, memories of the yellow fever epidemic of 1878 were beginning to dim.
But the National Board law was the closest Congress has ever come to setting up a federal department of health answerable ultimately to the President. The Marine Hospital Service, later to become the United States Public Health Service, was an arm of the Treasury Department, and, although it administered federal quarantine statutes, its role vis-4-vis state authority was largely advisory.
It is ironic that the series of events that finally brought about the transfer of quarantine authority to the federal government was set in motion by the State of Louisiana. A law was passed by that state in i882 requiring that ships passing up the Mississippi River submit to inspection at a quarantine station near the mouth of the river. Each ship was required to pay a "service" tax of $3 o . A steamship company, alleging that the tax was actually a tonnage tax, took issue, and the matter finally reached the Supreme Court in 1886. The Court, for which Justice Samuel F. Miller spoke, ruled in favor of Louisiana. But it also virtually invited Congress to pass an effective quarantine law:
[I]t may be conceded [said the Court] that whenever Congress shall undertake to provide for the commercial cities . . . a general system of quarantine, or shall confine the execution . . . of such a system to a National Board of Health
•.. all State laws on the subject will be abrogated, at least so far as the two are inconsistent. But, until this is done, the laws of the State on the subject are valid. 18 Louisiana's victory thus ultimately proved to be a pyrrhic one.
But Congress was in no hurry to act: members of Congress, unlike Supreme Court justices, had to run for office. Not until early 1893, in the last days of Benjamin Harrison's administration, did Congress move. It was by then safer to do so, largely because of a new threat of epidemic disease from abroad. In the late summer of BACKGROUND oF FEDERAL HEALTH CAiE LEGISLATION 1892, four ships arrived in New York harbor from Hamburg with cholera aboard, all among steerage passengers. Each of the ships had had deaths at sea from the disease. 9 The press sounded the national alarm and, before the year was out, the demand for a federal quarantine authority was widespread. The New York Times did its bit by quoting press opinion from all sections of the country during December 1892 and January of the next year. A Savannah paper said that the demand was not a partisan one but came from the people. Some papers hit the states' rights issue head on. The Chicago Tribune, for example, wryly commented, "The cholera will make this country much sicker than an infraction of the Jeffersonian ideas will," 2 and the Hartford Post twitted the antifederalist holdouts with the following:
The gentlemen of Texas and Louisiana propose if they die of cholera to be able to thank the Almighty that they caught it in a constitutional way, strictly Jeffersonian, and with regard for States' rights. 2 ' New York, as it turned out, had no cholera epidemic, but the scare, and the nation's reaction to it, were enough to overcome Congress's fear of moving in on the rights of the states with regard to quarantine. The then current Populist movement may also have had something to do with it. In Hofstadter's view, "Populism was the first modern political movement.., to insist that the federal government has some responsibility for the common weal .... , 22 Although the Populist Party never included a health plank in its platform, it unmistakably identified itself with certain types of social and political reform, some of which later became law even though the party itself had disappeared. In the mid-189os its influence was strong enough to enable it to poll thirty or more per cent of the popular vote in twelve states.3
In any case, a bill introduced by Representative Isidore Rayner of Maryland in late 189224 finally passed, but only after lively debate. The main opposition, following undiluted antifederalist lines, came from representatives from Alabama, Texas, and Louisiana, one of whom (Oates of Alabama) said, "[Ilt is desirable to keep out an invasion of cholera, and also of anarchists and communists...
. [I]t is right and
proper for Congress to do whatsoever it has authority to do to these ends." ' The federal government finally took over quarantine authority, partly because public fear of epidemics made it politically feasible to do so, and partly because the political climate itself was changing. The quarantine law of 1893 has received relatively little attention, largely because it bore on the health of the millions, not on that of the individual. But it was a major, if rather subtle, turning point in the evolution of federal and public attitudes toward the obligation of the central government in matters of health. Conservatives of the period were not altogether wrong when they said it was a foot in the door.
But the rise of the Progressives, roughly paralleling the advance to respectability and influence of the Socialist Party, focused the attention of the nation on government's obligation to the individual in general. Universal health insurance was singled out as a major objective, especially by the American Association for Labor Legislation, which, in 1916, drafted a model insurance law to be administered on a compulsory basis by the states 9 In the same year Meyer London, Socialist Congressman But it all came to very little at the time, owing largely to the immense wave of conservatism and anti-Bolshevist hysteria that swept the country in the last years of World War I and the period immediately following. New and oppressive alien and sedition laws, reminiscent of those of 1798, were passed, and, in Ghent's words, Within a year after the armistice we were in the midst of a tide of reaction which threatened to sweep away every social achievement gained during . . . the two previous decades. By that time or a bit later the whole fabric of social control had been rent and ravelled. '"The Democratic Party recognizes that not only the productive wealth of the Nation but its contentment and happiness depends upon the health of its citizens. It therefore pledges itself to enlarge the existing Bureau of Public Health and to do all things possible to stamp out communicable and contagious diseases.
. In any case, the Social Security Law of 1935 was the first major legislative result 2 As originally introduced by Senator Wagner and Congressman Doughton, the bill contained one title that, in effect, was a revival of Meyer London's resolution of 1916: it proposed a Social Insurance Board that was to make recommendations on "legislation and matters of administrative policy concerning old-age insurance, ... , health insurance, and related subjects."" But, owing largely to pressure from the AMA and to Roosevelt's fear that he might lose the whole social insurance package, the Social Insurance Board became the Social Security Board, and all reference to health was dropped. Thus altered, the bill passed the House with astonishing ease (372 yeas and thirty-three nays)," 4 and became law on August 14, 1935.
That such a sweeping federal social action should invoke virtually no organized political opposition (except for that of the AMA to the health provision of the original bill) is perhaps a measure of the depth of the crisis the nation faced at the time. And when opposition did arise, it had the paradoxical effect of confirming the social security principle as a permanent part of American political and social life. The opposition was in the form of suits brought by employers against the Collector of Internal Revenue. They reached the Supreme Court in early 1937 with the result that Mr. Justice Benjamin Cardozo wrote decisions that set the country on a new course. In Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, " 5 Cardozo cited the general welfare clause of the Constitution"' as the basis for upholding the Social Security Law, and, although neither Cardozo's decision nor the Constitution specifically mentions health, the inference was clear. Through Cardozo, the Court cleared up the confusion that had prevailed with regard to federal quarantine authority, which, to that time, had been thought to rest most solidly on the commerce clause. On the same day the Court, still speaking through Cardozo, said that tide II of the Social Security Law is not in opposition to the tenth amendment and that Congress may indeed spend money to protect the general welfare. "Nor," said the Court, "is the concept of the general welfare static. ... What is critical or urgent changes with the times." 47 And, "[w]hen money is spent to promote the general welfare, the concept of welfare or the opposite is shaped by Congress, not the states. " ' 48 From the constitutional point of view, the Cardozo decisions brought to an end the process that began with the Marshall decision in 1824. But politically the effect was not quite so definitive. Health had become a respectable political topic, and, after the Cardozo decisions, no political party dared ignore it altogether. The concept of a right to health gradually lost its nineteenth century limitations and focused more and more on the individual's health needs, broadly defined, although the country was not yet ready for comprehensive federal health legislation. The rising costs of health care may have been a factor in this change of emphasis. In the nineteenth century, relatively few of the nation's citizens had access to hospitals and specialists. Laboratory tests were virtually unknown; the x-ray was discovered by Roentgen in 1896 but came into general medical use only after World War I; the electrocardiograph dates from 1912 but was not in general use until after 193o. By the mid-i93os utilization of hospitals, which were formerly turned to only in case of terminal illness or major surgery (if at all), was increasing rapidly. Medical diagnosis and treatment had gone far beyond the stethoscope and epsom salts stage. The general practitioner's black bag no longer contained all that patients needed and were beginning to demand.
VI
Ti PosT-WoIu.-WA-II SCENE Although the health theme was expunged from the original Social Security proposal, it was never very far from Senator Robert Wagner's mind. Drawing on analyses that had been carried out to support the original Social Security bill, he introduced amendments relative to health in 1939 but without success. The threat of war in Europe and opposition by the AMA were obstacles too formidable to overcome. But in 1943 the battle was really joined. In that year Senators Wagner and Murray and Congressman Dingell introduced their first proposal for federal compulsory health insurance. They reintroduced such proposals in 1945, 1947, and 1949 , precipitating one of the major political battles of President Truman's administration. The bills all failed, but the intensity and bitterness of the fights over them were themselves evidence of the growing political importance of the health question.
The AMA's opposition was based primarily on its policies of the 1920S and led it, at great cost, into the first of its major national political campaigns. Whether the electorate was ready to accept federally-backed compulsory health insurance in the years immediately after World War II is a matter for conjecture. But the weight of Roosevelt's words in his State of the Union message on January ii, 1944, was such as to identify permanently the right to health with other fundamental rights in the American political system: 49 in that address he equated "the right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health" with fundamental social and political rights in his "Economic Bill of Rights.""
The return of the Republicans to office in 195z reassured conservatives with regard to the threat of comprehensive federal health legislation. President Eisenhower had publicly announced his opposition to compulsory health insurance, but, even so, his administration could not completely ignore the health insurance issue. It proposed a reinsurance system, leaving health insurance voluntary, 5 ' but the mood of Congress was conservative: nothing happened.
With that, the emphasis on federal guarantees of the individual's right to health, far from dying, merely shifted to a particularly needy group, the aged. The battle over federally backed health insurance for the aged stretched across three administrations and culminated with the passage of Medicare-Medicaid legislation in 1965. Its most dramatic moment came in May x962, when President Kennedy addressed an overflow crowd at Madison Square Garden, urging support for the then-pending King-Anderson bill. The AMA countered by staging its own program, televised the next night, immediately following the President's addressY 2 The issue, in the eyes of the AMA, was still basically one of states' rights. It had favored the Kerr-Mills bill of 196o, which assisted the aged to obtain health care through federal grants to the states, 5 3 whereas the King-Anderson bill would have extended benefits to the aged through the Social Security mechanism.
The King-Anderson proposal went down to defeat in 1961 although it never came, as such, to a floor vote. 4 Still the question would not die. The prospect of providing for the health of the aged by legislative means was a powerful political issue, and the essence of the King-Anderson proposal was reintroduced in 1964. The AMA countered with an imaginative proposal of its own, more liberal in its benefits than the King-Anderson bill but designed to hold federal authority at a minimum. The final result was a classic of political maneuvering in which the Johnson administration got more than it had originally asked and the AMA failed wholly in its effort to establish administrative authority over the system at the state level. (November 21, 1963) , according to outgoing president Donovan Ward, AMA spokesmen had just completed their testimony in Washington against the Medicare proposal. At that moment, he claimed "we were on the way to the most resounding legislative victory in our history as an organization."" But Lyndon Johnson, beholden (according to Ward) to labor and liberal forces, changed all that.
In some measure Dr. Ward may have been right. But the state-federal issue concerning authority in health matters had been settled at the federal level long since, and that fact has had the effect, since the I92Os, of putting the AMA in the position of a rear-guard unit. Medicare-Medicaid was passed, despite conservative opposition, and President Johnson journeyed, fittingly enough, to Independence, Missouri, to sign the bill into law in Harry Truman's presence. It was the culmination of a sociopolitical struggle that began in the Progressive Era and that had waxed and waned since World War I. The new law represented the creation of a national health system for two important segments of the civilian population. With its passage the federal government had at last directly guaranteed the right to health of broad classes of private American citizens.
Medicare was unquestionably a major watershed in the evolution of federal health policy. Once it was passed, the Eighty-ninth Congress, to which President Johnson understandably (from his point of view) applied the adjective fabulous, went on to other health matters. Next to Medicare, its most significant actions were the Heart Disease, Cancer, and Stroke Amendments of 19655" and the Comprehensive Health Planning and Public Health Services Amendments of I966.P 9 The title of the former is deceptive; although focusing superficially on the major killer diseases, the act actually was a first step toward regionalization of the nation's health facilities and personnel. In effect, it invites the nation to regionalize itself and to disregard internal political boundaries (state, county, and municipal) in doing so. It deals, therefore, with one of the country's most delicate internal political issues-states' rights-and almost certainly would have died in Congress if, when introduced, it had borne the title now applied to it: Regional Medical Program. It is having the effect of stimulating fundamental dialogue and experiment pointing toward reorganization of the 
CONCLUSION
No health legislation of basic importance has passed the Congress since 1966. (However, the pending-at this writing-Social Security amendments 0 may prove to be significant in their impact if the concept of "health maintenance organizations" embodied therein proves workable in practice.) The last few years have been a time of regrouping and reassessment of the nation's health problem. The most heated controversies since 1966 have had to do with funding and impact of existing legislation, not with new proposals. Debates now beginning (which the AMA refers to as "the gathering storm"") center on national health insurance. But there is increasing recognition, in and out of government, that national health insurance alone cannot guarantee the right to health in its present, broad sense. Other deficiencies, such as shortage and maldistribution of health personnel and facilities will also have to be taken into account.
Health insurance proposals now under discussion approach these latter issues in varying degrees. One of them is basically a voluntary financing (insurance) proposal and largely reflects AMA concepts. Another, introduced in Congress on August 27, 197o,62 by Senator Edward Kennedy and fourteen other Senators, takes its origins from the Model Bill of 1916, various aspects of Social Security legislation, and the work of the late Walter Reuther's Committee for National Health Insurance. It, in effect, proposes a comprehensive national health service in the form of a "working partnership" between public and private sectors.
As these dramatically different proposals come under debate, political influences, based largely on the precedents of the past, will once again emerge. But the social polarization of the nation and the continuing political and economic effects of the war in Viet Nam have, in themselves, created a new and volatile political climate. Whether the new conditions will hasten, or retard, national health service legislation cannot be predicted with confidence.
"0 H.R. 17550, 9st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Versions of this legislation were passed by both houses of the gIst Congress, but adjournment occurred before the differences could be resolved in conference. The proposal will be reintroduced in some form in the 92d Congress.
" National Health But the time for such action is probably close at hand and the reasons are not far to seek: the major constitutional and political issues were settled with the federal quarantine law of 1893, the Cardozo decisions, and the passage of Medicare-Medicaid. It remains now only to work out, hopefully on a pragmatic basis, the legislative and administrative details.
